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WHAT’S DEMOCRACY GOT TO DO WITH IT? A CRITIQUE OF
LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
Abstract: This paper examines the extent to which Ronald Dworkin’s
liberal constitutionalism, as presented in his recent work Is Democracy
Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate, can provide the
basis and impetus for the realization of democracy in contemporary
societies. The paper is divided into three main sections. We begin by
locating the broader institutional contexts within which debates about the
importance and salience of democratic politics have taken place and
introducing Dworkin’s distinctive and defiant contribution to those
debates. In the second and main section, we offer a substantial critique of
Dworkin’s proposals and demonstrate how his (and fellow
constitutionalists’) liberal project may be as much a part of the problem as
the solution. That critique is divided into four parts; it includes a series of
philosophical, political, constitutional, and historical arguments against the
democratic credentials of Dworkin’s project. The third section explores a
different approach to how democracy can be more effectively and fully
mobilized to meet present-day challenges; the emphasis here is on more
affirmative and constructive proposals. By way of conclusion, we
speculate on the directions that further efforts might take to fulfill the
promise of democratic politics in contemporary societies. We maintain
that, if democracy is to be realizable, then it needs to be of a more robust
and less derivative kind than Dworkin’s liberal project envisages. Rather
than arguing that any remnants of constitutionalism should be abandoned,
we propose to re-dress as we challenge the supposed balance between
constitutionalism and democracy and, in its place, combine a strong
democracy with a weak constitutionalism.
Keywords: democracy, liberal constitutionalism, Dworkin
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WHAT’S DEMOCRACY GOT TO DO WITH IT? A CRITIQUE OF
LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
By Allan C. Hutchinson and Joel Colon-Rios*
“Democracy forever teases us with the contrast between its ideals and its realities,
between its heroic possibilities and its sorry achievements”
– Agnes Repplier

I. INTRODUCTION
Democracy seems to be in trouble. It is not only struggling to win new
national recruits in the world, but it is having grave difficulty in those
nations where it is already considered to be established and enabling. This
is particularly true of those Old World states who are intent on promoting
its benefits to more sceptical New World countries: domestic threats to
democratic practices and ideals threaten to undermine the whole appeal
and exemplar of democratic government. Moreover, this seeming crisis is
mirrored by the state of democratic theorising. Commentators and scholars
lock horns over what is and is not demanded by a genuine commitment to
democratic governance. In particular, the fundamental tensions between
security and freedom, stability and change, and representative and popular
participation have become more evident and acute. From all sides of the
political spectrum, there is a crisis of confidence in the capacity of
democracy alone to meet the challenges of the modern age. Indeed, there
seems to be a deep anxiety that, while democracy has a role to play in
contemporary governance, there are definite limits to its provenance and
authority. In short, debate rages over the extent to which democracy has to
be confined and circumscribed in the name of some larger and more
encompassing political ideal.
Although Ronald Dworkin has been at the forefront of modern liberalism
in the past 40 years, he has spoken little directly about democracy.
Applying his own brand of rigorous philosophical analysis to recalcitrant
*

Distinguished Research Professor and Lecturer, Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University, Toronto. We are grateful to Leslie Green, Nicola Lacey, Martin Hevia, Ron
Podolny, and Diana Younes for their critical comments and helpful suggestions.
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problems of law and politics, he has flown the flag for a consistent and
progressive mode of liberal commitment; there are few hot-button issues
which he has not tackled and to which he has not brought an illuminating
stance. However, in his most recent monograph Is Democracy Possible
Here?, he has now turned his attention to the fraught state of American
democracy. Indeed, while his attention has been on defending the liberal
faith in illiberal times, his claim in this book can be fairly applied to his
whole scholarly oeuvre -- “I have been talking about democracy ... all
along.”1 Yet, for all its eloquence and power, his talk about democracy and
his assessment of its present condition is decidedly schizophrenic. While
he condemns present democratic arrangements as amounting to a
“degraded politics [which] are not only insulting and depressing; they are
not even democratic” (147), he commits himself to the foundational belief
that “Americans of goodwill, intelligence, and ambition have given the
world, over the last two centuries, much of what is best in it now” (163). It
is Dworkin’s enormous self-imposed task to reverse this ‘degraded
politics’ and make good on the best that American democracy has to offer.
In short, Dworkin’s reflections and exhortations capture much of the
anxious engagement in political debate generally -- the beacon on the hill
may be faint and fading, but it still retains the capability to ignite and
fulfill its traditional emancipatory mission.
In this essay, we want to examine the extent to which Dworkin’s liberal
project can provide the basis and impetus for such a democratic revival.
Rejecting such a likelihood, we canvass some of the familiar topics that
one might expect in a book titled Is Democracy Possible Here?, but which
Dworkin ignores -- the limits of democracy in large societies, the
maximization of popular participation, the problems or virtues of
representation, and the meaning of the idea of popular sovereignty. To do
this, the essay is divided into three main sections. In the first section, we
first locate the broader constitutional and institutional contexts within
which debates about the importance and salience of democratic politics
have taken place and then we introduce Dworkin’s distinctive and defiant
contribution to that debate. In the second and main section, we offer a
1

R. DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW
POLITICAL DEBATE 155 (2006) (hereinafter all page references are in parenthesis in
the text).
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substantial critique of Dworkin’s proposals and demonstrate how his (and
fellow constitutionalists’) liberal project may be as much a part of the
problem as the solution. That critique is divided into four parts; it includes
a series of philosophical, political, constitutional, and historical arguments
against the democratic credentials of Dworkin’s project. The third section
explores a different approach to how democracy can be more effectively
and fully mobilized to meet the challenges of the contemporary world; the
emphasis here is on more affirmative and constructive proposals. By way
of conclusion, we speculate on the directions that further efforts might
take to fulfil the promise of democratic politics in contemporary
constitutional societies.
For us, in contrast to Dworkin and other liberal constitutionalists, whether
‘democracy is possible here’ depends on what counts as democracy, what
possibilities it is thought to offer, and what weight it is given in political
debate.2 We maintain that, if democracy is to be realisable, then it needs to
be of a more robust and less derivative kind than Dworkin’s liberalism
envisages. However, we are not arguing that any remnants of
constitutionalism should be abandoned. Instead, we propose to re-dress as
we challenge the supposed balance between constitutionalism and
democracy and, in its place, combine a strong democracy with a weak
constitutionalism. While Dworkin’s invitation to “reinvigorate the
argumentative dimension of our politics” (8) is to be warmly accepted, his
own efforts result in more of a continuing affirmation of the present
situation in which elite debate by way of constitutional interpretation
passes for democratic engagement. Indeed, in contrast to many
contemporary constitutional critics and jurists, we insist that it is more
democracy, not less, that offers the best hope in moving forward in these
troubled times.
2

In talking about ‘here’, we recognise that some might think it odd that two Canadian
academics -- one a joint British/Canadian citizen (who will be teaching in the United
States next academic year) and the other an American citizen -- are analyzing the present
condition and future of American law and politics. However, this is a strength, not a
weakness. Our comments take Dworkin’s work to be directed at most ‘mature’
democracies, especially Canada and the United Kingdom. Accordingly, the challenge that
he outlines and our response to it are more general and less parochial. As Dworkin states,
“I shall for the most part speak of these [shared] principles as the common property of
Americans, but of course they are shared by a great many other people in the world” (7).

4
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II. THE LIBERAL PROJECT
A. CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY
Constitutionalism preceded democracy. The main elements of most states’
constitutional orders were firmly in place before all persons were treated
as citizens and before the franchise was extended to all those citizens. For
instance, in the United States, although the fundamental constitutional
compact was in place by 1787, the final extension of the franchise did not
take place until over 170 years later in 1964. Yet, even today, the
percentage of voting-age population who actually vote in federal elections
remains alarming low. From highs of mid-60%s in the 1950s and 60s to
present lows of around low 50%s for presidential election years; it is
presently around mid to high 30%s for mid-term elections. However,
despite the historical priority of constitutionalism and continuing low
electoral participation, the growth of democracy as both an idea and
practice has raised pressing concerns for political and legal theorists. In
particular, while the constitutional order has developed and changed over
time, the challenge of increased popular participation has obliged a reexamination of the appropriate and legitimate relationship between
constitutionalism and democracy.3 The relationship between
constitutionalism and democracy is clearly contested and complicated, but
is it on its deepest and best understanding complementary or
contradictory? Does the one reinforce and strengthen the other or is one
the negation of the other? Can there be a mode of ‘constitutional
democracy’ which is both coherent and reliable in effecting social justice?
The central notion of constitutionalism is that, although government is
established to serve popular interests, popular government must be
constrained in its powers if it is to retain authority in exercising those
powers. As such, constitutions not only organise and distribute power, but
they place limits upon its exercise. In its predominantly liberal incarnation,
there is a strong belief that there must be procedural and substantive limits
placed on what policies the citizens can require or expect their political
3

See generally John Wallach, American Constitutionalism and Democratic Virtue, 15
RATIO JURIS 220 (2002).
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institutions to follow. Indeed, these constraints on contingent democratic
demands can be seen as the foundational and enabling conditions for an
enduring and virtuous democratic polity. In this vision, democracy is not
the main process by which political justice is constituted or achieved, but
is merely instrumental to the preservation and expression of that goal.
There is, of course, much debate among constitutionalists about the nature
and extent of these limitations. Some of the most common arrangements
relied upon to achieve such a balance of power and accountability include
the familiar notions of separation of powers, adherence to the rule of law,
constitutional supremacy, and, of course, the protection of fundamental
rights through judicial review. As John Rawls, the leading modern liberal
constitutionalist put it, “in a constitutional regime with judicial review,
public reason is the reason of its supreme court.”4
These basic features of modern constitutionalism have much to
recommend them and have become accepted as the sine qua non of good
governance. However, this is not the whole story. Constitutionalism is also
characterized by an obsession with permanence, a resistance to
constitutional change and a suspicion of constituent assemblies.
Underlying many constitutionalist theories is the idea that, once the
constitution contains the right abstract principles and the correct balance
of institutional safeguards, it is a good and finished constitution. There is
room for fine-tuning in the details of its operation and implementation as
circumstances change, but there is no need or warrant for further changes
of a substantial or structural kind. The claim is that to alter the constitution
in important ways is to look for trouble, to play with the stability of a
political system, and to risk the precious ideal of the rule of law.5
4

JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 231 (1993). See also B. ACKERMAN,
WE THE PEOPLE, vols. 1 and 2 (1991 and 1998). For a more general appreciation of
constitutionalism, see Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione, Constitutionalism and
Democracy: Political Theory and the American Constitution, 27 BRITISH J. OF POL.
SCI. 595 (1997); Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalism in the United States: From
Theory to Politics, 10 OXFORD J. LEG. STUDIES 200 (1990); and Michel Rosenfeld,
Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay Between Identity and Diversity in
CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY (Michael
Rosenfeld ed. 1994).

5

See, for example, MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY
FROM THE COURTS (1999). This foundational component of constitutionalism was
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Moreover, the rise of democracy and the spread popular entitlement has
heightened those fears.
Democracy, of course, is one of the most uttered, yet least specified ideas
in the political lexicon. It can and has been utilised by many different
people in many different situations to defend or promote many different
states of affairs. Indeed, its malleable and contested nature is a large part
of its enduring political appeal. In the 1950s, it was reported that over
2000 years of political speculation had generated over 300 definitions of
‘democracy’.6 This number has likely increased even further in the
ensuing 50 years. Suffice it to say by way of introduction that the core of
the democratic ideal is the preference for ordering power and authority in
line with the views and requirements of the citizenry: the smaller that the
gap is between the rulers and the ruled and between the powerful and the
powerless, the better and more democratic that society will be. At its
strongest, democracy is seen to be not only a formal process for tallying
people’s preferences, but also as a substantive vision of what the ‘good
life’ should or could be.7 In regard to constitutionalism, the critical claim
is that democracy is relegated to a distinctly second-best position. In
particular, it is objected that the proposed limits on popular power are not
and cannot be self-executing and must be interpreted by someone. Because
there is no neutral or uncontested way to achieve that, the restraint on
popular authority is illegitimate. Moreover, popular participation is not (or
need not be) as unprincipled, arbitrary or self-serving as many
exemplified in late 18th and early 19th century France. The claim was that, as the
Revolution had done away with injustices, there was little more to do. As Napoleon
noted, “Citizens, the revolution is determined by the principles that began it. The
constitution was founded on the sacred rights of property, equality, freedom. The
revolution is over”. See ANTONIO NEGRI, INSURGENCIES: CONSTITUENT
POWER AND THE MODERN STATE (1999).
6

7

See DEMOCRACY, IDEOLOGY AND OBJECTIVITY (A. Naess et al. eds. 1956).

See, for example, B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY
POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE (1994). From a legal perspective, see JEREMY
WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999) and JED RUBENFELD,
FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
(2001).
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constitutionalists suggest. At its most strident, therefore, the democratic
critique of constitutionalism is that it operates more as a cover for elite
control and facilitates a tyranny of that elite over the majority. In short,
democracy and constitutionalism have very different attitudes and
approaches to the wisdom and reliability of popular politics.
In line with this, the primary tension in legal and political theory is not
between constitutionalism and democracy per se, but between different
accounts of constitutionalism in terms of their willingness to place more or
less confidence in popular politics in the pursuit of a democratic system of
governance. In short, in a constitutional democracy and in contested
matters of political morality, the central question is whether the prosaic or
primary location of authority and legitimacy is to be found in the
constitution or in the people? Traditional theorists have tended to view this
question as primarily philosophical in scope and substance. However, we
insist that, while the philosophical dimension is important, there are also
equally important historical, political and strategic aspects which demand
attention. Indeed, despite the frequently trumpeted value and importance
of democracy in modern politics, its institutional imperatives and
normative significance have been treated as decidedly inferior in the
constitutional scheme of things: the chronological precedence of
constitutionalism has been endowed with continuing conceptual priority
by modern commentators and officials. Indeed, modern legal and political
theory displays a discernible uneasiness towards the thrust and influence
of democracy. And Dworkin, for all his apparent defence and promotion
of democracy, is no exception.

B. OF JURISTS AND EMPERORS
Ronald Dworkin has been hard at work over the past forty years sculpting
and polishing a political and legal philosophy of ‘liberal legalism’.
Spurred on by the prolific output of his arch-rival Richard Posner, he
seems to have re-doubled his efforts in the last few years. Although he has
never quite fully succeeded in wresting away the restricting grip of
analytical positivism on modern jurisprudential scholarship, he has
managed to develop a broad and sophisticated jurisprudence which holds
to the implacable view that “law... is deeply and thoroughly political...,

8
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[b]ut not a matter of personal or partisan politics.”8 In doing so, he has
succeeded in putting issues of politics and morality squarely on the
scholarly agenda of law and legal scholarship, particularly in the field of
constitutional law. In becoming the chief proponent of a naturalist
jurisprudence, he has also been the main and most energetic flag-carrier
for progressive liberalism in contemporary American society.
His liberal positions on abortion, euthanasia, religion, and tax reform have
found considerable, if reluctant, favour among the liberal and legal
intelligentsia.9 Nevertheless, he has not managed to persuade many of his
colleagues that his naturalist methodology -- the jurists’ role is to offer
“the best justification of legal practice as a whole”10 -- is the best route to
go in defending such positions. His central jurisprudential claim that law
as-it-is entails and embraces law as-it-should-be (particularly from a
liberal standpoint) has met hostility from both liberal and non-liberal
critics alike. As a legal scholar who seems to be contested and resisted in
spite of his political views not because of them, Dworkin has wrought the
philosophical and juristic structure for a version of legal liberalism which
presents a formidable challenge to all those engaged in the fields of law
and politics. He has become one of the bona fide “seers and prophets” that
can legitimately lay claim to being willing “to work out law’s ambitions
for itself.”11 It is an imperial and imperious undertaking. Is Democracy
Possible Here? is a continuation and deepening of that liberal project with
the emphasise very much upon its political as opposed to its
jurisprudential dimensions -- “my main interest is in political principle, not
law” (9).

8

R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146 (1985).

9

See, for example, R. DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION (1993), FREEDOM’S LAW:
THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996), and
SOVEREIGN VIRTUE (2001).
10

R. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 152 (1986).

11

Id. at 407.
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In this latest monograph, Dworkin encourages citizens to engage in a
genuine argument about their political disagreements. For him, this task is
all the more pressing because the present state of American politics is
“appalling” and “divisive” (1) . To overcome this debilitating malaise,
Dworkin wants people to find some common ground through forging
some basic principles on which they all can agree and then debate about
which governmental policies might better reflect those shared principles.
His self-imposed mission, therefore, is not only to identify what he thinks
are the “shared principles of sufficient substance to make a national
political debate possible and profitable” (6), but to examine some of the
most controversial topics on the contemporary political agenda, such as
terrorism, religion, and taxation, in light of them. This is an ambitious,
timely, and laudable venture. Whatever else one might have to say about
his performance, Dworkin cannot be faulted for his scholarly mettle. In
grappling with the conundrums and conflicts of contemporary politics, he
resembles nothing so much as the civic intellectual rather than the
detached jurist.
Dworkin begins by outlining the principles which comprise “the common
property of Americans” (7) and which might provide “the common ground
that makes genuine argument among people of mutual respect possible
and healing” (5). These are the principles of ‘intrinsic value’ and ‘personal
responsibility’ and will come as no surprise to followers of Dworkin’s
writings. The first principle holds that human life has a “special kind of
objective value” (9-10) and that it matters when a particular human life
succeeds and when it fails. For Dworkin, to accept this principle is to
appreciate the dignity of human life itself: “you cannot act in a way that
denies the intrinsic importance of any human life without an insult to your
own dignity” (16). On the other hand, the second principle holds that
every human being has a “special responsibility for realizing the success
of his own life” (10) and that includes deciding what a successful life is
for him. For Dworkin, it is unacceptable that people subordinate
themselves to the will of others in identifying value in their own lives.
These two principles together “define the basis and conditions of human
dignity” (10) and Dworkin refers to them as principles or dimensions of
dignity. He then offers these two principles as having “sufficient
substance” and as being “sufficiently deep and general so that they can
supply common ground” for a political debate “about their interpretation
and consequences for political institutions and practices” (11).

10
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Dworkin’s extended argument about the substantive and institutional
implications for American politics of such informing principles is, as
expected, bracing and beneficial; his sophistication and range is truly
impressive. However, as even more expected, he concludes that anyone
who works from these principles and accepts them should reject certain
policies currently defended by conservatives such as the existence of
different legal procedures for citizens and foreigners suspected of being
involved in terrorist acts, the teaching of intelligent design as a scientific
alternative to Darwinian evolution, the prohibition of gay marriage, and
the adoption of important tax cuts for the rich. There can be no doubt that
Dworkin can safely assume that he will have succeeded in his main
ambition -- “I said that I wanted to start an argument, and I have done my
best” (160). Whether he will have managed to convince his political
opponents is less likely and will have to be seen.
However, our brief is not to engage in a partisan or tendentious argument
about the shared nature of his guiding principles or his liberal rendition of
them; we are more concerned to examine the broader and deeper
democratic implications of his philosophical analysis and political
arguments. Nevertheless, that being said, although many of Dworkin’s
positions might chime with our own, a couple of critical observations are
in order. First and more generally, it is difficult to see how his two
principles of human dignity will be accepted as ‘common ground’ by his
conservative adversaries. Despite Dworkin’s insistence that “the principles
are not in themselves political” (161), they seem to take a very
individualistic and inherently liberal slant and leave little space for
religious or other group commitments as many seem to demand and rely;
it will be difficult for conservatives to frame their concerns in a way that is
true to their own apparent operating assumptions.12 Second and more
specifically, some of the concrete positions taken seem unclear or
problematic. For instance, exactly why the death penalty is consistent with

12

See, for example, A. ETZIONI, RIGHTS AND THE COMMON GOOD: THE
COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE (1995) and SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, WHO
ARE WE?: THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S NATIONAL IDENTITY (2004). See
generally, JOHN MICKLETHWAIT AND ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE RIGHT
NATION (2004).
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the principle of ‘intrinsic value’, particularly when torture and humiliation
are considered as violations of it, is hard to appreciate.13

C. TWO VIEWS ON DEMOCRACY
At the end of Is Democracy Possible Here?, Dworkin announces that “I
have been talking about democracy in this book all along” (155). This
follows quite naturally from his early works in which he has defended the
jurisprudential position that a combination of constitutionalism and
democracy is not only possible, but best exemplifies the special appeal of
American politics and its historical practice. It will be remembered that
Dworkin has devoted his career to the claim that it is not only appropriate,
but necessary that the courts as a ‘forum of principle’ and, by way of
constitutional review, serve as the final authority on contested matters of
political morality. If judges do this properly, they will offer a moral
reading of the constitution which will “elaborate a coherent constitutional
morality.”14 This is not presented as a violation of democratic governance,
13

Also, Dworkin’s line of argument about human rights seems to justify the U.S.
invasion of Iraq. If a nation is justified in invading another only when the latter engages
in violations of baseline human rights, that is, “rights that forbid acts that could not be
justified by any intelligible interpretation of the ideas that people’s lives are of equal
intrinsic value and that they have a personal responsibility for their own lives” (36), these
rights include, naturally, the right not to be tortured. Under this view, no doubt the United
States was justified in invading Iraq, as the right not to be tortured was arguably routinely
violated there. Dworkin even seems to use the idea of a nation being justified in invading
another as a test for determining when a practice constitutes a baseline violation, as he
does in the case of the death penalty: “But the case that capital punishment violates
human rights seems, as I said, at best inconclusive as a baseline matter. We can
understand the opinion of those who think it does, but they would no doubt agree that it
would be preposterous for other nations to invade Texas or Florida to stop the practice,
even if they were powerful enough to succeed” (40).

14

Dworkin, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra, note 9 AT 40. See also Ronald Dworkin,
Equality, Democracy, and the Constitution: We the People in Court, 28 ALTA. L. REV.
324 (1990). In R. DWORKIN, JUSTICES IN ROBES (2006), he offers a similar defence
of democracy. He states that “partnership in self-government ...is structured and made
possible by a moral constitution guaranteeing to individuals one by one the prerequisites
of full membership.... [and that] we are committed by our history to an institutional
strategy of asking judges -- men and women trained in law -- to enforce those guarantees
of equal citizenship.” Id. at 139.
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but as a realisation of the very highest ambitions of democracy. Indeed, it
is the main burden of this recent publication to develop and justify further
the substantive conception of democracy that he has relied on to date.
In Is Democracy Possible Here?, Dworkin presents the two fundamental
principles of human dignity as the source of ‘partnership democracy’. This
is his favored interpretation of the democratic ideal and he distinguishes it
from a strictly procedural conception which he labels ‘majoritarian
democracy’. The majoritarian view maintains that democracy is simply
government in accordance with the will of the greatest number of people
as expressed in the election of officials (131). On this understanding, the
policies adopted by a legislative assembly can be characterized as
democratic because they are favored by a majority of the electorate. But
this view does not hold that the majority is always right or that its
decisions will always be fair. On the contrary, a majority may make very
wrong or unjust decisions, but that is not relevant for characterizing those
decisions as democratic. For Dworkin’s majoritarian, the question of
democracy is exhausted in the procedure by which a decision is taken:
substantive content is eclipsed by procedural source. As such, the
majoritarian view of democracy “allows us to say}that a decision is
democratic even if it is very unjust” (134) and, therefore, presents itself as
purely procedural ideal, independent of other dimensions of political
morality.
According to Dworkin, the obvious problem with this conception is that it
cannot explain what is good about democracy because it incorrectly
assumes that the sheer weight of popular numbers contributes something
of special value to a political decision (143). In this respect, Dworkin
claims that some of the traditional arguments in favor of majority rule
(e.g., that majority rule results in wiser and better government and that it is
the only fair method of decision making) are mistaken. He maintains that
there is no reason, historical or philosophical, to think that a majority is
any more likely to reach the right answer about moral issues than a
minority. Moreover, he contests the claim that majority rule is fair because
it gives each citizen equal political power: representative government
gives much more power over political decisions to people who hold office
than people who do not. For Dworkin, therefore, the partnership view of
democracy qualifies the relationship between majority rule and
democracy. For him, democracy does not mean that the majority should
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always or even most of the time have the final word: all that democracy
requires is that the people govern themselves by treating each individual as
a full partner in a collective enterprise (131). Consequently, in Dworkin’s
partnership version of democracy, decisions are democratic only when the
conditions that protect the status and interests of each individual as a full
partner are met. Thus, when a community decides by majority rule (or by
unanimity for that matter), to ignore the interests of some individual or
group, its decision will not simply be unjust and open to rebuke: it will
have nothing to do with democracy.
Unlike the majoritarian view of democracy, partnership democracy not
only has substantive implications, but it is defended by Dworkin precisely
because “democracy is a substantive, not a merely procedural , ideal”
(134). The merit of a particular law or policy and, therefore, its potential to
improve democracy is not assessed by considering the procedure by which
tit came into being; its substantive cut and content must be consistent with
and preferably capable of advancing the “theory of equal partnership”
(134). If that theory allows for such content, then the law or policy has
democratic credentials whether it would have arisen from majoritarian
politics or not. In Dworkin’s approach, therefore, the true test of
democratic merit is in no way connected to its institutional source or
procedural pedigree, but is exclusively controlled by whether it can be
made to square with the philosophical demands of the two foundational
principles of human dignity.
Nevertheless, Dworkin does consider that the partnership view of
democracy has procedural implications. When there are disagreements
about what law or policy is more consistent with a democratic ideal, there
must be a reliable procedure in place for reaching collective decisions. Not
surprisingly, as with the substantive implications of partnership
democracy, these procedures must follow from the same principles of
intrinsic value and personal responsibility. From the former, it can be
deduced that a community must show equal concern for the human beings
that live within its borders. According to Dworkin, this is best achieved
with widespread and roughly equal suffrage because “officials elected by a
broad swath of the population will do a much better job of protecting the
weak against special privilege and tyranny than officials elected by and
responsible to only a few” (144): the test of whether a constitutional
arrangement shows genuine procedural equality is to inquire “whether that
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arrangement is likely to produce policies that respect substantive equality
in concern for people’s lives” (145).
Similarly, from the second principle of human dignity, Dworkin concludes
that it follows that political arrangements must respect the personal
responsibility of individuals. This is taken to imply that a contingent
majority has no automatic right to impose its will over other human
beings, even if the majority’s laws and policies are designed in a way that
further their overall interests. Consequently, the second principle of human
dignity is considered to require that the basic procedure utilised to reach
and validate collective decisions be compatible with the principle of selfgovernment. Although it might compromise a person’s dignity to submit
to the decisions of others, such dignity is not compromised when that
person does take part, as an equal partner, in those decisions (145). The
upshot of this is that Dworkin understands the institutional implications of
self-government primarily in terms of the protection of certain individual
rights. While all persons must be able to participate in collective decisions,
there are certain aspects of each participant’s life that must not be
susceptible to interference by such collective decisions. In this respect,
therefore, the usual slate of fundamental rights must be guaranteed,
including the right to participate in collective decisions as both voter and
candidate for office; this will ensure that the majority will not impose its
will in deciding whether and how religion or other ethical values will play
a part in an individual’s life.
By way of conclusion, Dworkin argues that his account of partnership
democracy, unlike the majoritarian one, fits very well the structure of the
American constitution and presents it in its very best light. As he states,
“the list of constitutional rights in the United States Constitution, as these
have been interpreted by American courts over recent decades, does a
reasonably good job of identifying and protecting the political rights that
flow from the two principles of dignity and converting those political
rights into legal rights” (32). Of course, that does not mean the United
States is a paragon of partnership democracy, even if its basic structure
approximates to its procedural ideal. As Dworkin shows throughout Is
Democracy Possible Here?, some of the concrete policies adopted by its
legislature violate the substantive requirements of the principle of intrinsic
value and the principle of personal responsibility. Nevertheless, Dworkin
makes a resounding case for why the general structure and practices of
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American constitutional politics are so desirable and definitive:
exceptional lapses from democratic grace merely serve to prove the
general rule of constitutionalist integrity.

III. THE DEMOCRATIC CRITIQUE
In crafting and defending his account in Is Democracy Possible Here?,
Dworkin has left no doubt that not only are constitutionalism and
democracy compatible, but that his vision of liberal constitutionalism is
the best available. Indeed, he is clear that democratic politics are an
inferior mode of constitutional politics because it is important to put many
matters of political morality outside the reach of popular political debate
and disagreement. For him, it is simply axiomatic that “[judiciallyenforced] constitutional rights ... are not compromises of democracy, but
rather attempts to guarantee it” (146). Consequently, insofar we maintain
that this is a mistaken and unnecessary conclusion, we must demonstrate
why that is so. In the critique that follows, we mount a four-pronged
rejection of Dworkin’s position and proposals:
1. the philosophical argument relies on a dubious objectivist
epistemology which is ill-suited to his larger democratic project;
2. the political argument offers a very limited role for popular
participation in the governmental scheme of things;
3. the constitutional argument does not take seriously the importance
of openness and revisability in a democratic culture; and
4. the historical argument over-estimates the success of constitutions
and courts as the best protectors and promoters of liberal justice.
Throughout this section, we will insist that democratic politics need not be
muted and marginalised in the struggle to achieve social justice and
political virtue. On closer inspection, Dworkin’s distinction between the
partnership and majoritarian views of democracy is highly suspect and
unconvincing; it represents an unwarranted domestication and
trivialization of the democratic ideal and its transformative possibilities. If
democracy is truly limited in accordance with Dworkin’s account, it is not
surprising that many citizens and commentators might abandon and even
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renounce democracy as a regulative theory and practice. However,
democracy is far from exhausted or best showcased by the limited
possibilities of Dworkin’s partnership and majoritarian accounts. To reject
Dworkin’s favoured ‘partnership democracy’ is not to embrace the
impoverished and caricatured vision of majoritarian democracy that
Dworkin portrays: democracy is a much richer and ample idea and
practice than that.

A. A PHILOSOPHICAL MISTAKE
Dworkin talks a good deal about the search for “the common ground that
makes genuine argument among people of mutual respect possible and
healing”(5) as a way of stabilizing and moving forward his political
agenda. It is intended to be a conciliatory and inclusive gesture which will
establish his democratic bona fides. However, there should be no mistake
that this search is less a political endeavour than a philosophical
undertaking. He insists that “there is an objective standard of success in
living” (13). By this and in line with his earlier work, Dworkin means to
insist that there is some objective ground or moral facts-of-the-matter
which must necessarily underpin this foundational effort to find common
ground. Indeed, when it gets down to it, Dworkin does not seem very
interested in collaborating with his fellow citizens in order to build some
basic and shared philosophical principles to support the political
engagement. Instead, he is involved in the more familiar, yet less collegial
assignment of unearthing some given set of informing principles. In so
doing, he gets his project off on entirely the wrong foot by betraying the
supposedly democratic foundations of his philosophical and political
constructions.
Despite appearances to the contrary, Dworkin offers a standard objectivist
account of political morality. As a committed conceptualist, he takes
social practices (i.e., law, morals, etc.) and subjects them to a logical and
abstract inquiry in order to determine and illuminate their essential
features. In a revealing passage about the epistemological nature of his
political inquiry in Is Democracy Possible Here?, he states that “there is
objective truth to be had in the realms of ethics and morality ... because the
opposite, skeptical claim is philosophically indefensible ... and rejecting
that skepticism is part of the common ground we share” (46). These are
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not a merely throw-away lines for Dworkin; they go to the heart of his
continuing intellectual project. He maintains that it is not a philosophical
mistake to talk about values as being true or false. For him, values are real
in that their existence or character are not reducible to anyone’s beliefs or
preferences. While he admits that this stance is controversial, he
nevertheless continues to promote and defend it. Indeed, he has recently
gone so far as to state that:
just as a scientist can aim, as a distinct kind of project, to reveal
the very nature of a tiger or of gold by exposing the basic
physical structure of these entities, so a political philosopher
can aim to reveal the very nature of freedom by exposing its
normative source. In each case we can describe the enterprise,
if we wish, as conceptual. The physicist helps us to see the
essence of water; the philosopher helps us to see the essence of
liberty.15
In pursuing this conceptual and essentialist goal, Dworkin maintains that
reflective height is the guarantor of moral depth. In resolving difficult and
contested issues of political morality, he reminds judges that “the ladder of
theoretical ascent is always there, on the cards, even when no one is
tempted to take even the first step up it” and that “we cannot pursue that
indispensable ambition [of living together as equals] unless we undertake,
when necessary, to ascend high enough in our collective deliberations,
including our adjudicative deliberations, to test our progress in [ensuring
that the principles under which we are governed treat us as equals].”16
Insofar as he expects judges to make an occasional ‘justificatory ascent’ in
order to ensure that substantive or local justice on any particular issue is
not achieved at the price of formal inconsistency with the law’s own
overarching principles, Dworkin would surely expect at least as much and
perhaps more from his philosophical interlocutors. Accordingly, although
he frames his initial inquiry in the inclusive terms of searching for
15
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common ground and shared principles, he also insinuates that there are
some objective facts-of-the-matter which can be found and that, once
found, should discipline future debate and disagreement. These
exhortations to turn all problems into philosophical ones and to demand a
particular philosophical resolution of them are of the most dubious
provenance. With these broad flourishes, he exposes the contrivance of his
gesture to look for shared principles and, instead, dismisses not only
anyone who disagrees with that, but also any serious attempt to remain
true to a democratic spirit of inquiry and debate. Indeed, there is little
room for debate when confronted with ‘facts’; they demand only
acknowledgment or denial.
On a more rigorous democratic approach, there is no need to accept this
very particular and frankly elitist characterization of the philosophical
enterprise. It is simply wrong to posit that the only alternative to an
objectivist philosophy is a skeptical stance which contends that “our
opinions about how to live are not reports of objective fact but just
projections of our deepest emotions” (13). This is simply not the case and
does scant credit to the American philosophical tradition.17 Dworkin
caricatures the skeptical position, particularly in regard to opinion being
“just projections of our deepest emotions” (13). But, as he concedes, these
skeptics still continue to “suppose that there is a better and worse way for
them to live and that it is important to live in the better way” (13) and that
they believe that “we can make mistakes about what it is to live well, and
these mistakes are matters for very great regret” (14). To take that stance
is not to subscribe to Dworkin’s objectivist view and nor is it a matter of
emotional projection. The possibilities are much richer than in Dworkin’s
limited and monochromatic epistemological world.
Moral clarity or progress is not about ascending to some higher, more
removed and abstract plane on which rationality can hold sway outside of
the disabling influence of interests, commitments, fuzziness, history,
culture and ideology; it is about closing the gap between aspirations and
17
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actuality, about making the world a better place. There is simply no need
to posit the existence of objective moral facts which can be discovered by
seeking some ahistorical detachment or justificatory height. Philosophers
like Dworkin cannot seem to accept that justification is not about the
abstract or special relation between ideas, but is a social practice that has
or requires an external authority to its own contextual development.
Indeed, it is far more preferable to abandon the conceit that it is only
possible to be “theoretical” if one escapes the bounds of “cultural and
social” context and seeks to transcend “traditions and genres” as Dworkin
does.18 So often, this manoeuvre simply operates as an elaborate ploy to
endow personal preference with the trappings of objective truth.
In line with a democratic commitment, it is better to work from the
premise that, when it comes to morality, there is no fact-of-the-matter
which is independent of argument and debate; the grounds of political
morality are within the debate, not outside or regulative of that debate.
Echoing John Dewey and other pragmatists, Hilary Putnam is persuasive
that “ethical talk needs no metaphysical story to support it ...; it only needs
what ethical talk ... has always needed: good will, intelligence, and respect
for what can be seen as grounds and difficulties from within the ethical
standpoint.”19 This ethical talk is by its nature social and contextual. It is
social in that it amounts to more than the idiosyncratic or private
‘emotional projections’ of particular individuals. And it is contextual in
that it is always located in social settings, but never entirely overwhelmed
by them. Consequently, “the standard of success in living” (13) is neither
objective nor subjective as Dworkin is wont to suggest. Being
collaborative and contextual is entirely complementary to and compatible
with a democratic appreciation of politics and political debate.

18

Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 87
at 133-34 (1996). For a more extensive critique of that position, see Hutchinson,
Casaubon’s Ghosts: The Haunting of Legal Scholarship, 21 Legal Studies 66 (2001).

19

HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY 9495 (2002). See also J. DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE 407-08 (2d ed. 1958); R.
RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 266 (1999); and Hilary Putnam, A
Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1671 (1990).

20

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 03 NO. 04

Ironically, Dworkin begins his own philosophical quest in exactly the
place that democratic pragmatists would recommend -- the search for a
“common ground to be found between the trenches of ... hostile political
armies” (6). This is a laudable project that is not only important for
democracy, but that goes about it in a way that is democratic in form and
ambition. The project itself is exactly what skeptics approve of and
recommend. It is not about confronting people with ‘objective facts’ which
they have little choice other than to acknowledge: it is about working with
the available conversational resources, engaging with others, and seeking
to build, not impose, a common set of assumptions and shared values
through “real argument” (6). Sadly, Dworkin fails to sustain this
democratic project and, instead, reverts to objectivist type. Although he
protests that “no nation’s politics can be run like a philosophy seminar; a
democracy must give the final verdict on who leads it to many millions”
(127), almost all of Is Democracy Possible Here? is given over to exactly
that; it is an objectivist lesson in moral fact-finding in which the professor
speaks and the citizens listen. This is a far cry from a democratic exercise.

B. A POLITICAL SQUEEZE-OUT
Nothing has come easy to the democrat; the history of democracy is a tale
of resistance and courage. There is no reason to think that it is any
different today. If people are to take an active part in governance at all
levels of the community, there has to be a constant struggle to advance the
project of ‘closing the gap’ between governed and governors by way of
‘popular participation’. On this strong account, democracy is not
exhausted in watching others decide what is best for the people;
democracy is a mode of government by the community as well as for it.
However, these ideals of democracy have often been belied and
occasionally betrayed by their practical realisation. Beginning in 6th
Century B.C. Greece, there was less a democracy and more a timocracy in
which wealth and land ownership (not to mention, being male and
unenslaved) were a condition of the voting franchise. Indeed, a skeptical
review of democracy’s history suggests that there is almost a disturbing
‘inverse correlation’ between the extension of the franchise and a
reduction in the amount of power in which the enfranchised can
participate: the more that people are allowed to participate as an electorate,
the less that is left to their decision-making authority. Nevertheless, a

2007]

WHAT’S DEMOCRACY GOT TO DO WITH IT?

21

persistent rallying-cry of democrats has been the need to involve people as
fully as possible in all those institutions and agencies which influence and
affect their daily lives.
However, for all the political hoopla and hollering in support of
democracy and its political significance, there has been a distinct distrust
of ordinary citizens’ capacity to participate fully, freely, frequently and
actively in their own governance. In the twentieth century, democracy
came to be associated almost exclusively with the institutional and
competitive struggle for people’s votes by those leaders who sought
political power. Accommodating prescriptive ideals to descriptive
realities, commentators and politicians reduced popular participation to
little more than the demand for free and fair elections among multiple
political parties in a context of relatively open information: “democracy is
government by officials who are accountable and removable by the
majority of people in a jurisdiction.”20 Along with the judicially-enforced
protection of basic civil rights, this constrained idea of democracy has
come to dominate and is the accepted gold standard of democratic
legitimacy for almost all contemporary regimes; the goal of a more
extensive popular participation seems to have fallen by the wayside.21 Yet
this radical separation between the rulers and ruled is a very far cry from
what democracy meant just a few centuries ago, even to its opponents. By
and large, democrats have been thwarted in their efforts to institutionalize
20
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the belief that the governed are not only competent to elect their
governors, but also entitled to make political judgments for themselves
about all, not only some substantive issues. Indeed, democracy has almost
become a form of government that most 18th century anti-democrats
would be willing to support.
Dworkin’s view of the role and place of democracy in constitutional
governance fits snugly in this received tradition. Both of his ‘majoritarian’
and ‘partnership’ accounts are satisfied and fulfilled by the election of
officials every few years. The only fundamental difference is that his
favoured partnership account qualifies and limits the nature of the laws
and policies that those officials might adopt. Whereas majoritarian
democracy is merely the election of officials every few years, partnership
democracy is the election of good officials every few years (i.e., officials
that only adopt laws and policies that are compatible with Dworkin’s
shared principles of human dignity). Participation is not something to be
valued in and of itself. This explains why Dworkin emphasises the
importance of introducing changes in the public education system and in
election law which will directly strengthen the quality of political
argument (147). By receiving a public education which includes the
discussion of topical controversies, citizens will be better prepared to
make informed decisions about the selection of officials (148). Moreover,
various reforms -- modifying election law so as to require the existence of
special public broadcasting channels to offer continuous election coverage
during each presidential election, limiting overall radio and television
expenditures for all candidates, and establishing a ‘right to comment’
whereby all major cable networks must set aside a slot for each principal
political parties to correct what they understand as error or bias in that
network’s reporting -- will result in a more engaged electorate (150-52).22
There can be little doubt that such innovations are to be welcomed and
will likely enhance the popular political culture and facilitate electoral
participation. Nevertheless, they remain limited in focus and ambition;
they will do little more than improve the sort of spectator or consumer
democracy which underlies both of Dworkin’s majoritarian and
22
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partnership views of democracy. These narrow conceptions of democracy
reduce politics and popular participation to a system in which people are
expected to select among candidates for office as if they were products
marketed and sold to them by the major political parties. Political life
begins to mimic commercial enterprise; electoral politics is reduced to a
hollow spectacle in which form triumphs over substance.23 Indeed, it is
exactly this limited and limiting depiction of political engagement and
popular participation that helps to bring about the “appalling” and
“divisive”(1) state of contemporary politics that Dworkin so rightly
deplores. A such, his proposals do as much to perpetuate and entrench the
problem as remedy and improve it. Whereas majoritarian democracy
permits people to choose among products through the right procedures,
partnership democracy only permits them to choose good products. The
changes in education and election law that Dworkin suggests appear then
as the ‘Consumer Reports’ of democratic politics, helping people to
distinguish between good and bad candidates or, more accurately, between
those candidates who do and do not favor policies that are consistent with
Dworkin’s principles of human dignity.
Because Dworkin’s conception of popular participation amounts to little
more than “voting and holding office” (48), there is simply no possibility
to take seriously a more active and extensive practice of popular
participation. Neither of his democratic conceptions seeks to create
institutions that maximize the participation of citizens in the continuing
processes by which legal and regulatory policies are debated and enacted.
This ought not to come as a surprise because, under Dworkin’s vision of
those substantive principles of human dignity which should animate
democracy, an increase in and deepening of popular participation might
actually hurt rather than improve democracy. For instance, according to
Dworkin, a system that maximizes the greatest involvement by ordinary
citizens in deliberation and decision-making in a variety of settings and by
a variety of devices might well be less democratic than the United States
today if that system produces the ‘wrong decisions’. On the other hand, a
system that leaves those decisions in the hands of an unelected group of
officials might well constitute an exemplary democracy as long as the
23
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right decisions are produced. As such, it is clear that both Dworkin’s
conceptions of democracy potentially deprive the political system of the
participation of citizens in the adoption of the rules that govern their lives.
Democracy cannot merely require, as Dworkin suggests, a system that
gives “the final verdict on who leads it to many millions of people” (127,
emphasis added). This is to put popular participation squarely and
perversely in the service of oligarchy, not democracy. Moreover, even
Dworkin’s defence of the right to vote is dubious in democratic terms
because it tends to reduce it to only consequential and symbolic value. For
Dworkin, voting in regular elections is important because it is the best way
of ensuring that government officials act with equal concern for all the
human beings within the state’s boundaries rather than with special
concern for only a segment of the population (144). Accordingly, even
voting, which is an essential, but small part of what the ideal of popular
participation entails, is not fundamental in itself; it is important only
insofar as it advances the more fundamental principle of ‘equal concern’.
This means that, if it was more defensible or prudent to rely on another
mechanism to guarantee that officials treated citizens with equal concern,
even voting as the remaining avenue for popular participation would be
dispensable. Dworkin anticipates that allegation, but, in doing so, only
manages to confirm that voting’s importance is more symbolic than
anything else. For Dworkin, depriving a citizen of equal vote would show
a lack of concern and would constitute “the most blatant and symbolically
outrageous possible violation of the democratic conception of human
dignity” (145). Participation in the election of officials is welcomed and
defended, but only as an adjunct to advancing his vision of liberal
constitutionalism.
In marginalizing popular participation, Dworkin is in good company.
However, those who adopted a similar strategy of containment considered
themselves to be the opponents of democracy, not its champions. In
particular, the post-revolutionary theorists of the eighteenth century
recognised the subversive potential of popular participation: that is why
they opposed it. For them, popular participation was by its very nature
problematic as it entailed sharing decision-making and granting political
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power to the lower classes of society.24 Of course, the Federalists were
also in this group and gave clear voice to their fears. As part of his general
aversion to the ‘tyranny of the majority’, James Madison himself warned
that “[pure] democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and
contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or
the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as
they have been violent in their deaths.”25 Not surprisingly, Madison’s did
not evince much anxiety about an executive or minority tyranny, but
contented himself with resisting universal suffrage as it would drive a
wedge between public opinion and private property. Like Dworkin, the
Federalists not only understood democracy as warranting popular
participation in government, but offered ‘representative democracy’ as a
more manageable and less disruptive alternative: they did not defend
representation as a response to the practical reality of a large federal
republic, but recommended a large federation in order to make
representative, as opposed to direct, democracy necessary. Madison
favoured representative government precisely because it would work as a
bulwark against popular participation: “the larger the republic the better,
since the ratio of representatives to represented would thereby be
reduced.”26 This is to embrace popular participation only so as to smother
it better.
Consequently, even if it requires some trade-offs and compromises to be
put into practice in large societies, democracy is a regime of popular selfgovernment which not only allows for, but relies upon participation by
citizens in the formulation and enactment of the laws that govern their
24

See Claude Ake, Dangerous Liaisons: The Interface of Globalization and Democracy
in DEMOCRACY’S VICTORY AND CRISIS 282 (Alex Hadenius ed.1997); Sheldon
Wolin, Fugitive Democracy in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING
THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 37 (Seyla Benhabib ed. 1996); and Ellen
Meiksins Wood, Democracy: An Idea of Ambiguous Ancestry in ATHENIAN
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (J. Peter Euben et al eds.1994).

25

THE FEDERALIST 61 (no. 10) (Jacob Cooke ed. 1961).

26

Id. at 283.

26

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 03 NO. 04

lives. At its most general, it is the rule of everyone by everyone.27
However, the fact that the contemporary institutions and arrangements
considered ‘democratic’ are far from the most participatory forms of
political organization that might exist is not considered a weakness or
failing by Dworkin and other faux-democrats. Indeed, they are presented
as the very kinds of institutions and arrangements that democrats should
defend: the perverse position appears to have been reached in which
popular participation is dispensable and no longer treated as an essential
part of what is considered to be ‘democratic’. Under liberal
constitutionalism, democracy is exhausted by a constitution that
establishes representative government, protects liberal rights, and enables
all citizens to ‘participate’ in government by the election of officials. This
is an impoverished and disabling idea of democracy and one which has
little place for the emancipatory potential of popular participation and
democratic openness. But it is also the democracy of constitutional
democracy and, more pertinently, of Ronald Dworkin.

C. A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFUSION
Democrats are especially preoccupied with sources. No matter how fair a
legal principle or rule seems to be, a democrat will always be interested in
questions about its origin and, therefore, its legitimacy. In particular, the
whos and hows of any established principle or enacted rule will be of
compelling interest. A vital and principled dimension of any just law is the
fact that it originated in an exercise of self-legislation by the governed, not
simply be imposed or made on their behalf: democracy is about rule by the
people and not only for the people.28 However, the democratic pedigree of
27

MICHAEL HARDT AND ANTONIO NEGRI, MULTITUDE: WAR AND
DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF EMPIRE 240 (2004).

28

A number of jurists have been giving some thought to what it takes for a body of law to
be regarded as the law of the people to whom it applies, not only in traditional the sense
of them being its subjects, but in the stronger sense that the law is theirs, something that
they
made.
See
Frank
Michelman,
Constitutional
Authorship
in
CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 76 (Larry Alexander
ed. 1998); FRANK MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY (1999); Waldron,
supra, note 7 at ch.3; and Jeremy Waldron, Can there be a Democratic Jurisprudence?
(unpublished paper, April 2004).
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a law is not the only concern of a democrat: democratic lineage is a
necessary, if not always sufficient condition for an initiative’s just quality.
Both the matter and manner of laws are important. Indeed, it is the
procedural mode of their creation that bolsters and underwrites the
substantive merit of those laws; matter and manner are intimately related
and re-enforcing. While this attention to sources has considerable salience
in the legislative arena, its implications are even more pressing in regard to
constitutional or fundamental laws which, by their nature, are often
beyond the reach of day-to-day politics. Accordingly, the amenability of
such constitutional arrangements and fundamental laws to periodic reconsideration and revision seems an indispensable part of any democratic
compact. While our earlier political objection concerned the nature of
present democratic arrangements, our constitutional criticism focuses on
the past and future of democratic governance.
For constitutional democrats, like Dworkin, the equal attention paid to
procedural means in relation to substantive ends is unacceptable because
they consider that it is the ‘rightness’ of the decision that trumps all other
concerns. Dworkin is firm on this. In his version of a substantive
conception of democracy, he welcomes and defends the permanent
institutionalization of what are taken to be the right abstract principles
which people, if truly rational, would have chosen anyway. The legislative
policies adopted by a representative assembly must accept the intrinsic
value of human life and respect the capacity of each individual in deciding
what counts as a successful life if they are to be considered democratic.
His partnership view of democracy fuses together substance and procedure
because it asks that policies are not only adopted ‘democratically’, but that
they are just and, therefore, compatible with the shared principles of
dignity. This is why Dworkin says that the partnership view of democracy
“fits the basic structure of our own political system very well” (146) and
that the Constitution, as interpreted by courts over recent decades, “does a
reasonably good job of identifying and protecting the political rights that
flow from the two principles of dignity and converting those political
rights into legal rights” (32).
For Dworkin, if the results of popular participation do not do not chime
with his preferred liberal vision of human dignity, they are unacceptable
and, in constitutional terms, should be rejected. This places tremendous
weight on the democratic legitimacy of existing constitutional
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arrangements. In particular, it obliges serious scrutiny to be given to the
relation of democracy to the people and their constitution -- how did the
constitution came into effect (e.g., is the constitution the result of a
democratic process?) and how can it be altered (e.g., can the constitution
be altered through democratic means?).29 However, neither of Dworkin’s
alternative views of democracy addresses the democratic quality of
constitutional arrangements or fundamental laws. Whereas the
majoritarian view is perfectly compatible with a constitution adopted from
the top-down and containing stringent limitations on popular participation
even in times of constitutional change, the partnership conception of
democracy sets the traditional content of a liberal constitution as its
procedural pre-condition and renders the issue of popular participation in
possible constitutional change as simply irrelevant. By presenting the
content of a liberal constitution as the procedural implications of the two
‘principles of human dignity’, Dworkin moves the fundamental provisions
of the constitutional text outside the reach of democratic politics: “we may
better protect equal concern by embedding certain individual rights in a
constitution that is to be interpreted by judges rather than by elected
representatives, and then providing that the constitution can be amended
only by supermajorities” (144).
29

One scholar who has explored how constitutions are ordained by “majority-rule
popular sovereignty” and whether that can be done (lawfully) again is Akhil Reed Amar.
See Akhil Reed Amar, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 109 (Sanford Levinson ed. 1995). His central
argument is that the U.S. Constitution is a populist document that recognizes the legal
right of the American electorate of altering their constitution in ways not contemplated in
its amendment procedure. He maintains that the U.S. Congress would be obliged to call a
constitutional convention if a majority of voters so decided and that amendments
proposed by such a convention could be lawfully ratified by a simple majority of the
electorate. For Amar, the procedure contemplated in Article V enumerates only the
modes in which government (as opposed to the people) can change the constitution. See
Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside
Article V, 94 COLUMBIA L. REV. 457 (1994). While Amar’s defense of popular
sovereignty involves a radical rejection of the traditional principle of constitutional
supremacy, he nevertheless seeks to legalize the democratic principle by looking for a
place for popular sovereignty in a juridical arrangement and by locating the origin of the
right to alter government in the constitutional text itself. However, in so doing, he fails to
recognize the political character of the conflict between constitutionalism and democracy.
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Yet Dworkin is not finished. He goes on to argue that majorities should
not be allowed, “whenever they wish, to change the basic constitutional
structure that seems best calculated to ensure equal concern” (144).30
However, it is unclear why he allows for the possibility of constitutional
change at all. If a constitution provides for the rights and procedures that
make partnership democracy possible, as Dworkin insists the United
States Constitution does, then there is little reason to be concerned at all
with how it came into existence or whether it can ever be re-written. In
light of this, Dworkin’s protest that “no nation’s politics can be run like a
philosophy seminar” (127) seems particularly empty at the level of the
fundamental laws. When the abstract principles of human dignity ground
democracy, it is philosophy, not politics, that have fundamental priority in
the constitutional scheme of things. Indeed, the whole point of Dworkin’s
philosophical enterprise is to insulate the foundational principles of liberal
constitutionalism from democratic politics.
This antipathy to popular participation is embodied by existing approaches
to constitutional reform. The motivating idea is that change should be
infrequent because the stability of a juridical order is an primary value to
be protected. However, constitutional democrats do concede that a large
part of a liberal constitution’s legitimacy rests in the fact that it can be
changed through juridical means. Consequently, by way of compromise,
liberal constitutions tend to make the process of amendment so arduous
that few proposals for change are able to meet its stringent requirements.31
30

In this, Dworkin follows John Rawls who stated that basic liberties must “no longer be
regarded as appropriate subjects for political decision by majority or other plurality
voting}They are part of the public charter of a constitutional regime and not a suitable
topic for ongoing debate and legislation”. See Rawls, supra, note 4 at 151.

31

Also, these limits on constitutional reform extend well beyond basic liberties and
include the entire structure of government. The amendment provisions of most modern
constitutions underwrite the permanence of the constitutional order. See, for example,
Article V of the U.S. Constitution. These provisions usually involve a set of requirements
that are more difficult to meet than those followed when the constitution was originally
adopted. While most constitutions are adopted by some form of majority rule,
constitutional amendments are traditionally associated with super-majorities and other
obstacles designed to decrease the possibility of important transformations. Some
constitutions even place some clauses outside the scope of the amendment procedure,
thus highlighting the fear of constitutional change that characterizes constitutionalism.
See, for example, Article 79.3 of the German Basic Law.
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Moreover, the proto-typical liberal constitution does not include
mechanisms which increase popular participation during times of
important constitutional transformation. There is little reference to, for
example, the election of delegates that deliberate in extra-ordinary
assemblies whose proposals have to be ratified in referendums: democratic
legitimacy is thought satisfied by the involvement and authority of
ordinary representatives.32 This effort to regulate transformative shifts not
only makes constitutional change difficult and infrequent, but also works
to effect a permanent closure of the political. By making all political
power subservient to the disciplinary protocols of the constitution and the
rule of law, it no longer becomes reasonable to speak of important
constitutional transformations except after cataclysmic events such as
revolutions and coup d’états. Even after those events, it is thought that “by
making a constitution, the revolutionary forces are digging their own
graves.”33
For the democrat, a political system that has entrenched the ‘right’ abstract
principles in what is thought to be a finished constitution and that has
frozen in place a particular juridical arrangement sits uncomfortably with
any genuine commitment to democracy. Democracy resists political
closure; it fosters, not forecloses political and popular engagement. While
a more democratic position is not indifferent to outcomes and is promoted
on the basis that it will result in a more just society, its critical wager is
that the governed will produce more outcomes which are more conducive
to society as a whole than those dictated by abstract and partial principles
or by elite institutions and agencies. It should be clear that the democratic
critique is not about a conflict between rights and popular participation,
but about the institutionalization of a juridical arrangement that, by
32

See Steven Holmes and Cass Sunstein, The Politics of Constitutional Revision in
Eastern Europe in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 277 (Sanford Levinson ed. 1995) and Jon
Elster, Introduction in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 3 (Jon Elster and
Rune Slagstad eds. 1988).

33

Ulrich Preuss, Constitutional Powermaking for the New Polity: Some Deliberations on
the Relations between Constituent Power and the Constitution, 14 CARDOZO L. REV.
635 at 641 (1993).
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embodying the principles of liberal constitutionalism, is removed from
democratic politics. If democracy is only about right outcomes, and if
those outcomes are already embedded in a constitutional arrangement and
removed from popular discussion and debate, the ideals of openness and
popular participation with respect to the fundamental laws are rendered
meaningless. On the contrary, democracy insists that all arrangements
must be open and fluid at least on regular and mandated occasions.
While the concern in non-democratic societies to “organize political
institutions so that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing
too much damage” is understandable,34 it is condescending and
inappropriate in ostensibly democratic cultures. If ordinary laws and
especially fundamental laws do not result from the exercise of popular
participation, then there may be talk of good or bad laws, but not of
democracy. In a robust democracy, everything is always ‘up for grabs’ and
present institutional arrangements should always be open to revision and
replacement, albeit not frequently or haphazardly. It is not a case that
‘anything goes’, but that anything might go.35 With democracy comes risk.
But that is both the exhilarating promise and the ever-present danger of
democratic governance.

D. AN HISTORICAL REMINDER
In proposing his moral reading of the constitution, Dworkin’s gamble is
not only that judges will be capable of utilizing the appropriate
philosophical method, but that they will arrive at the ‘right’ results or,
what is the same thing, those results that he favours. This is as much a
strategic and historical claim as a philosophical one. Yet, an observer who
is not committed to or even interested in the internal operations of the
judicial process might want to assess the judicial interpretation of the
34

35

KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (1965) vol. 1 at 107.

See Cornelius Castoriadis, The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy in
CASTORIADIS READER 282 (David Curtis ed. 1997). See also A. HUTCHINSON,
IT’S ALL IN THE GAME: A NON-FOUNDATIONALIST ACCOUNT OF LAW AND
ADJUDICATION (2000) and ALAN KEENAN, DEMOCRACY IN QUESTION:
DEMOCRATIC OPENNESS IN A TIME OF POLITICAL CLOSURE 10 (2003).
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constitution strictly in terms of the actual outcomes reached; the results,
not the reasoning, will be the acid-test of the liberal gambit. Consequently,
whatever principled or theoretical arguments Dworkin may successfully
make about the need to contain popular participation in the name of liberal
constitutionalism, his proposals still run up against what he has termed
“the brute facts of legal history.”36 Such an historical accounting is far
from kind or reassuring to the constitutionalist cause, be it of a liberal or
conservative stripe.
Even a cursory glimpse at the historical sweep of constitutional law
strongly suggests that the political performance of the courts has been
mixed at best. For instance, the roads from Dred Scott to Brown (and
perhaps back towards Plessy) and from Lochner to Lincoln Federal (and,
again, perhaps back towards Lochner) are chastening ones.37 Whether a
liberal or conservative, any political enthusiast who takes seriously the
historical record ought to have second thoughts about the wisdom of
relying on the courts to deliver the democratic goods. Indeed, the Bush v.
Gore fiasco -- a decision which Dworkin considers “egregious”, “partisan”
and “shame[ful]”38 and which robbed democracy of its duly chosen
36

Dworkin, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra, note 10 at 255.

37

See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 US 393 (1857); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US 537 (1896);
and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 US 483 (1954). Plessy has experienced something
of a renaissance in the form of the rebellion against affirmative action: any resort to racebased categories is treated as invalid. There are echoes of Brown J.’s dissent in Plessy in
Thomas J.’s judgment in Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 512 US 200 (1995). See also
G. LOURY, INDIVIDUALISM BEFORE MULTICULTURALISM (1996). As regards
Lochner v. New York, 198 US 45 (1905) and Lincoln Federal Labor Union v.
Northwestern Iron and Metal Co., 335 US 525 (1949), the decisions in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, 483 US 825 (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114
S.Ct. 2309 (1994) seem to embody a Lochner-style approach. See Note, Resurrecting
Economic Rights: The Doctrine of Economic Due Process Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1363 (1989) and Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: the New Economic Orthodoxy of
‘Rights Management’, 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1999). For further discussions of these
continuing historical episodes, see A. HUTCHINSON, EVOLUTION AND THE
COMMON LAW ch.5 (2006).
38

Dworkin, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra, note 14 at 23, 101 and 259. See also Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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presidential representative -- is strong evidence of why Dworkin should be
at least skeptical, if not dismissive, of the Supreme Court’s capacity and
willingness to advance his constitutionalist vision of liberal politics over
the long haul. But it is a mistake to approach Bush v. Gore as an
unfortunate aberration from an historical liberal script or a conservative
exception that confirms the rule that a judicial review is the best way of
advancing and protecting liberal democracy. In fact, during the last few
years, the Supreme Court has struck down important liberal legislative
policies and resisted liberal interventions on individual rights. For
example, the Court in Lopez, invalidated a federal criminal prohibition on
the possession of guns in local school zones; in Morrison, invalidated the
civil damages section of the federal Violence Against Women Act, ruling
that acts such as date rape were not economic activities that substantially
affected interstate commerce; and in Padilla, declined, on jurisdictional
grounds, to rule on whether Padilla could be held indefinitely in military
custody as an enemy combatant without being charged.39
Accordingly, even if Dworkin’s preferred conception of democracy were
to be adopted and approved, there are few historical or strategic reasons to
prefer a strong system of judicial review over a system of legislative
supremacy. As Dworkin himself has expressed, in the current
constitutional arrangement, the people and their representatives have to
“accept the deliverances of a majority of the justices, whose insight into
[controversial and profound questions of political morality] is not
spectacularly special.”40 The risks of injustice or, as Dworkin would put it,
wrong and illiberal outcomes seem to be always present. Unlike Supreme
Court justices, members of congress at least do not operate behind a
dubious curtain of impartiality and can be removed through the ordinary
electoral process. After all, in Is Democracy Possible Here, even Dworkin
had little choice but to recognize that, since in recent years Supreme Court
justices have once again become active in striking down congressional
39

See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000); and Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). See also Padilla v. Hanft, 126
S. Ct. 1649 (2006), where the Supreme Court denied Padilla’s petition on certiorari after
he was charged with crimes and released from military custody.

40

Dworkin, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra, note 9 at 74.
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legislation of a liberal pedigree, “liberals are}beginning to rediscover the
supposed virtues of the majoritarian conception of democracy” (138).
The idea is not to idealize legislatures. Even Dworkin has some
misgivings about the present role and decisions of the present Supreme
Court and admits that, although “we must not condemn judicial review as
undemocratic whenever we disagree with decisions the court makes”, he is
“worried about an ideological administration appointing young ideological
judges whose tenure on the courts will last for generations” (158): he
recommends an encouraging a fifteen-year tenure limit for judges.
However, he remains optimistic that this conservative period is an
interlude because he notes that in a decade or so “the nation [will have]
steered itself back to the middle as, so far, it always has” (158). On the
historical record, there is strong support for regular toing-and-froing
between liberal and conservative phases, but this is only ‘so far’ and that
prediction can only be of relatively cool comfort to the liberal
constitutionalist. There is simply no reliable way to make a historical
projection about whether the courts over the next couple of decades will
be more or less like the Warren or Rehnquist court. Whether it should or
should not be that way as a matter of constitutional rightness, as Dworkin
contends, is almost besides the strategic point. Defending a moral and
correct reading of the constitution might well be throwing good theoretical
money after historical bad. Of course, Dworkin might well insist that it is
the burden of constitutionalist “seers and prophets”41 to struggle against
historical recalcitrance and persuade judges and jurists of the error of their
prosaic ways. But this will be a political claim which itself must be
anchored in firmer historical ground than the soft sands of prophetic
platitude that “Americans of goodwill, intelligence, and ambition have
given the world, over the last two centuries, much of what is best in it
now” (163).
In referring to the historical record of judicial review, there is another
large problem with Dworkin’s approach and proposals. In diagnosing that
contemporary “degraded politics are not only insulting and depressing;
they are not even democratic” (147) and prescribing a strong corrective of
41

Dworkin, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra, note 10 at 407.
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moral reflection, he fails to consider or comprehend that his preference to
place the courts at the democratic heart of the constitutional compact is
very much part of the problem, not the solution. In democratic terms, it
may not be the case at all that the “constitution ... is one of America’s
greatest political advantages” (155). Indeed, a continued and heavy
reliance on a judicially-enforced constitution might be such a disabling
disadvantage that it has contributed to the very degradation of democratic
politics that it is supposed to ennoble. If the most important issues of
political controversy are routinely placed beyond or withdrawn from
popular politics, it should come as no surprise that this will work to
promote democratic disaffection by sapping people’s political energies
and atrophying their participatory instinct. Ironically, this lack of interest
in politics in ‘large and complex societies’ is precisely why the
constitutionalists defend non-participatory institutions. Making courts into
a primary venue for democratic engagement perpetuates the idea that
social justice comes from a judicial act of noblesse oblige rather than a
popular product forged in the furnace of political debate. Unless the
presently disaffected can become part of their own future empowerment,
there can be no confidence that apathy and indifference will not persist.
Indeed, Dworkin and his constitutionalist ilk increase the odds that the
degradation of politics will become further entrenched.
Finally, an historical awareness suggests a very different appreciation of
the relation between constitutional arrangements and prevailing political
sensibilities. Constitutions do not speak or act for themselves: their
contingent operation and shifting meaning are closely, if complicatedly,
connected to broader political forces and democratic dynamics. A
constitution will not hold back an overwhelming political impetus: it is
only a bulwark against injustice, apprehended or real, if there is a
democratic will to interpret or rely on it to do so. Similarly, constitutional
decisions which take a firm stand against injustice do not occur or stick
unless there is a popular openness to such interventions. Legal efficacy
depends on political viability: the ebb and flow of court decisions do not
happen in spite of democratic leanings, but, at least in part, because of
them. Any juridical order which is not underpinned by a democratic
culture, no matter how liberal its constitution and how stringent its
procedures for constitutional change, is always at risk of falling victim to
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popular disruption and even rejection.42 Conversely, a juridical order
which is more consistent with the idea of democratic openness and has a
culture of political equality is also at risk, albeit a lesser risk. No
constitutional arrangements are acceptable if they can only survive by
keeping democratic politics in an institutional straitjacket. As such, liberal
constitutionalists like Dworkin over-estimate the instrumental impact of
constitutions, even as they tout their symbolic significance.

IV. A DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE
It ought to be clear that, while we have sympathy for Dworkin’s overall
project to salvage democracy from its presently parlous condition, we do
not believe that Dworkin’s proposals have done much to contribute to that
task. Indeed, we maintain that constitutionalists like Dworkin might well
be stymieing efforts to develop and substantiate a more progressive and
energized democracy than is likely to exist in the near future;
‘constitutional democracy’ is the failed liberal attempt to balance
democracy and constitutionalism. Accordingly, it is incumbent upon us to
offer an alternative view of the relation between constitutionalism and
democracy so that the ordinary citizenry can become “a full partner in a
collective political enterprise” (131). In contrast to Dworkin, we insist that
there needs to be a democratic or weak form of constitutionalism. As such,
we place our confidence in the claim that, if provided with better and more
extensive institutional opportunities to participate in their own governance,
people will cultivate a greater appetite and aptitude for political
engagement. If domination breeds largely subservients, then democracy
will beget mainly democrats. In short, the best way to “reinvigorate the
argumentative dimension of our politics” (8) is more democracy, not less.
To that end, we will adumbrate a more affirmative case for increased
popular participation and then offer a realisable series of modest proposals
to achieve that end.
42

The events of 1989 in Europe are an example of how “even powerful and longenduring organizations of state coercion and ideological hegemony fall before radical
dissent”. Neil MacCormick, Constitutionalism and Democracy in THEORIES AND
CONCEPTS OF POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION 144 (Richard Bellamy ed. 1993).
See also Waldron, supra, note 7 at 310.
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A. BEYOND LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
‘Democracy’ is one of the most relied upon, but least explored terms in the
jurisprudential lexicon. Indeed, its malleable and contested nature is a
large part of its enduring political appeal. At the heart of the democratic
ideal is the understanding that people should rule over themselves. The
smaller that the gap is between the rulers and the ruled and between the
powerful and the powerless, the better and more democratic that society
will be. In ‘closing the gap’, any sensible democratic theory must pay
attention to both the ‘formal’ and ‘substantive’ elements of democracy.
While it will be essential to ensure that there exist appropriate venues and
processes through which people can participate in government and hold it
accountable, it will also be equally important to look at the substantive
conditions in which people live so that their participation can be relatively
equal and robust. As such, electoral participation is not a full or true
indication of a society’s democratic health. At its starkest, it would be
difficult to suggest that a country which extended the vote to all citizens
was deserving of democratic accolades if the largest part of the population
lived in miserable conditions, with a short life expectancy, and with little
education or employment prospects. This would be more travesty of the
democratic ideal than its realisation.
Any country which claims to be democratic will be disposed to take
measures to facilitate ‘closing the gap’ between its governing elites and its
governed majority. While there is no need or warrant for absolute equality
(as this would stifle individual initiative and require constant
governmental supervision and readjustment), a commitment to democracy
suggests that everyone, not only some and certainly not only a few, should
share in the good and bad fortune of that society. To be genuine
democratic participants, people must be emancipated from bondage of all
kinds, economic, social, and cultural. If the extent of participation by
lowly citizens in those power-centres which affect their lives is the
measure of democratic progress, the inimitable Aristotle remains pertinent
in his judgment that “the real difference between democracy and oligarchy
is poverty and wealth. The rich are few and the poor are many ... where the
poor rule, that is democracy.”43 Equality of opportunity demands more
43

ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1279b40-1280b5 (B. Jowett trans. 1943). It would be less
troubling for there to be a maldistribution of substantive resources and opportunities if the
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than the dismantling of formal barriers to participation, it also requires
continuing substantive and affirmative measures to actualize those
opportunities and possibilities. Consequently, democracy’s commitment to
equality must be as substantive as it is procedural.
Democracy is better thought of as a social way of life in which everything
that affects the conditions of people’s lives is potentially encompassed;
democracy is a value and process which can inform all aspects of social
life. Viewed this way, democracy is the commitment par excellence to the
idea that almost all choices and actions have political roots and political
consequences: people can tackle those politics within a framework within
which their active participation is more important than (or, at least, as
important as) that of elected representatives and appointed elites of
political sages. In particular, democracy need not be construed as simply a
set of processes and practices tagged on to a particular political ideology,
whether it be liberalism, conservatism, socialism, or whatever. Indeed,
democracy is a mode of life, an ethos, a way of day-to-day living within
which the best of such ideologies and political commitments can be
harnessed and their excesses jettisoned. In that sense, the robust brogue of
democratic politics insists that the liberal or socialist is only one kind of
democrat and that the democrat is not only one kind of liberal or socialist.
Accordingly, our approach to democracy is very strategic and political; it
is not conceptual or philosophical in Dworkin’s sense. Rather than talk in
absolute terms about the overall democratic quality of society, it is
preferable to concentrate on those measures which are proposed to be
taken to make a society more democratic. From this standpoint,
‘democracy’ is not a black-and-white idea or practice; a society is not
either democratic or undemocratic. It is a matter of shading and degree.
most recent trends were towards reducing or modifying it. However, over the past decade
or so, the trend has been in the opposite direction -- the extent of inequality in wealth and
income is getting worse and the gap between the haves and the have-nots is increasing.
For instance, in the last 25 years up to 2004, not only were income gains more
concentrated at the top of the income scale, but the average after-tax income of the richest
fifth rose by about 100% as compared to about 5% for the poorest fifth. See
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, HISTORICAL EFFECTIVE FEDERAL TAX
RATES: 1979 TO 2004 (December 2006). By any sort of democratic standard, this
decline (as opposed to the absolute level of inequality) is profoundly troubling.
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While it will be necessary to make trade-offs within a democratic society
(i.e., as between distribution and production, freedom and equality, etc.), it
is unnecessary and ill-advised to make trade-offs with democracy. To
think in such terms is to misunderstand democracy. Consequently, rather
than think about democracy as one particular thing or to evaluate a state of
affairs as being democratic or not, it is better to ask whether taking a
particular step is likely to advance democracy; this will be a contextual
and contingent assessment. As such, the type of democratic commitment
which we defend is pragmatic and contingent rather than idealistic or
absolutist. The primary consideration in any effort to effect change will
always be -- what present measures will best increase the greater
participation and control which people have over those institutions and
practices which most affect their lives today?44 While it is better that more
are involved more of the time than less are involved less of the time, it
seems counter-productive to deny a reform proposal or strategy the term
‘democratic’ because it does not involve everyone all the time; it is a
democratic mistake to let the best be the enemy of the good.
That being the case, it is possible to highlight several strategic and
pragmatic commitments against which any particular proposal or reform to
advance the democratic project can be assessed. These are what we shall
call ‘the four basic precepts of democratic advancement’. Taken together,
they confirm the emancipatory and transformative potential that lies within
democracy. :
1. more extensive participation is better than less extensive -- because
democracy is as concerned with the pedigree of power as its
effects, any state of affairs which multiplies and broadens the
number of locations, whether public or private, in which
participation is possible is more likely to advance democracy than
not:
2. more participation is better than less participation-- because
involvement is a benefit in itself and can beget a taste for even
further involvement, any state of affairs which increases the degree
44
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of direct as well as indirect or substantive as well as formal
participation is more likely to advance democracy than not:
3. more equal participation is better than less equal participation -because people experience a sense of genuine participation only if
their involvement is effective and counts, any state of affairs which
tends to ensure that no one has more power than any one else is
more likely to advance democracy than not;
4. more responsibility is better than less responsibility -- because
people cannot be expected to be involved all the time in all
locations in all circumstances, any state of affairs which renders
those with temporary power more accountable to others is more
likely to advance democracy than not.
Democracy does not have all the answers to life’s challenges. Indeed,
democratic theory embraces the idea that there are no once-and-for-all
right answers and nurtures a practice which seeks to accommodate
difference of opinion rather than do away with it. As evidenced by
Dworkin and other liberal constitutionalists, democracy has too often been
viewed as more the icing on the political cake than part of the cake itself;
it has been used to serve interests other than its own. Indeed, the constant
pressure to constrain and cabin democracy is plain evidence of a fearful
acknowledgment of democracy’s power to subvert the status quo and, in
particular, to threaten the power of various entrenched elites. By ensuring
that democracy’s broad mandate (i.e., including social and economic as
well as political matters) and deep mandate (i.e., requiring regular
sustained acts of participation) are both respected, it will better ensure that
the citizenry become “a full partner in a collective political enterprise”
(131) and that it is possible to “reinvigorate the argumentative dimension
of our politics” (8). To do this demands that there are greater efforts to
pluralize and circulate the sites and situations in which democracy is at
work: it is not possible to have “democracy with a Big D in the system as
a whole if you do not have real democracy with a small d at the level
where people live, work, and raise families in their local communities.”45
45
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By being flexible and pragmatic, democrats can accept that compromise as
well as conviction are important qualities. However, those four precepts
outlined can help bridge the existing divide between democracy’s past and
future, between its commitment and achievement, and between its vision
and reality. In particular, they can better inform the project of democratic
renewal in the constitutional context.

B. SOME CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS
Democrats stand for all that constitutionalists fear. Unlike
constitutionalists, they do not contend that the purpose of constitutional
democracy is to protect democracy from itself.46 Indeed, constitutionalists
only manage to pass themselves off as democrats because they shave the
idea of democracy so thin that they transform constitutionalism into the
democratic telos. In contrast to the slender and diluted offerings of such
constitutionalists, democrats maintain that ‘rule by the people’
recommends at least two general and indispensable commitments on the
constitutional front -- (1) an institutional openness in which even the most
fundamental principles are open for discussion and are always susceptible
of being reformulated or replaced and (2) empowering a group of human
beings so that they come together in political equality and settle on the
laws that will regulate the institutions and practices under which they live.
In order to for these rules to be the people’s own, it must be today’s people
who rule, not past generations: the constitutionalist idea of precommitment cannot be brought to a final reconciliation with democracy.
Consequently, while a self-governing people must be able to reformulate
their commitments for themselves and do so by democratic means,
‘openness’ must of necessity be limited openness. For there to be critique
and revision, some basic threshold of institutional structure and individual
entitlement (e.g., open elections, balanced constituencies, access to
information, etc.) which make such democratic activities possible must be
in place. However, these limits to democratic openness, are the limits of
democracy itself.
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In this effort to de-sacralize and de-frost the constitutional order, there are
a number of strategies that might be adopted so as to redress better the
traditional balance between constitutionalism and democracy. Although
they by no means exhaust the possibilities for tapping into and engaging
the transformative potential of the citizenry that is presently suppressed,
these initiatives might include:
1. A Reduction in the Powers of the Courts -- The concern with
granting the judiciary the power to strike down legislation is not
restricted to academic critiques about the legitimacy of judicial
review. It has received several institutional responses throughout
the world: courts can rule on, but not rule out government acts
which are considered to offend the constitution. In the United
Kingdom, for example, a court may issue a “Declaration of
Incompatibility” if it is convinced that a legislative enactment is
incompatible with one of the rights enumerated in the European
Convention of Human Rights which has been incorporated into
domestic British law. Such a declaration does not mean the statute
in question is invalidated or that Parliament is required to respond
in anyway: the legislation continues to have full validity, but the
declaration has the effect of empowering the relevant minister to
initiate a ‘fast-track’ legislative procedure to amend the statute in
question.47 . New Zealand’s approach grants even less power to
courts. Courts are not only expressly forbidden from striking down
a statute that is deemed inconsistent with enumerated rights, but
they are required, whenever possible, to interpret statutes in a way
that is consistent with the recognized rights and freedoms. Because
declarations of incompatibility rely on their political and symbolic
effect to promote change, these Commonwealth innovations are
more compatible with the democratic project.48 The importance of
this kind of proposal is that it not only speaks to the legitimacy of
judicial review in terms of the so-called ‘counter-majoritarian
47
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difficulty’, but that it recognises that popular participation suffers
when society’s most important political controversies are left in the
hands of an elite body of legal experts.
2. Establish a Separate Constitutional Court -- In combination with
reducing the courts’ powers, it would also be advisable to change
the organisation of the courts and their personnel. Rather than give
ordinary courts the power to review the constitutionality of
government acts, it would be more in line with a democratic
project to establish separate and specialised constitutional courts
which had exclusive authority to do so. Such a practice has a
relatively long history and has been particularly attractive to states
emerging from fascist or oppressive regimes. For instance, South
Africa has adopted such a model in its post-apartheid
governance.49 In fulfilling this mandate, the court could have the
power to perform traditional review as well as entertaining
advisory and non-binding references from government on proposed
policies. Although many of the actual constitutional courts in
existence are typically staffed by state-appointed judges, it would
also be possible to think of such agencies as being ‘constitutional
councils’ rather than courts. The membership of such bodies might
well be more mixed and representative. For instance, councillors
could be elected for a lengthy, but designated period and have
qualifications which do not include being legally-trained. Such
reforms would not only enhance the democratic legitimacy of the
courts, but it would also bring a broader set of professional skills
and judgments to the exercise of the council’s constitutional
responsibilities.
3. Creation of a Legislative Override -- The ideas of taking away
from courts the power of striking down ‘rights-violating’
legislation or re-organising the courts and their personnel might be
too threatening to the American constitutional tradition.
49
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Consequently, a less disruptive alternative would be to give
Congress a genuine power to override judicial decisions which
invalidated legislation. This power would be similar to the
‘notwithstanding’ provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. Incorporated as an indispensable part of the political
bargain which facilitated the introduction of the Charter itself in
1982, this provision enables the federal and the provincial
legislatures to override for a renewable period of five years, by
simple majority, the rights contained in the Charter.50 However, we
maintain that the preferable legislative override would operate only
after a judicial opinion has been rendered: the legislature would
then have the choice of overriding that judicial decision through
the same process by which ordinary legislation is adopted. For this
constitutional device to work effectively, it must not be viewed as
the last resort of an intransigent legislature that is intent on
violating people’s rights. On the contrary, it should be recognized
as an essential feature of democratic politics by which an elected
assembly declares that it is not ready to give jurists the final word
on particular contested policies. The democratic balance of power
would countenance against the results of the legislative process
being subordinated to the legal expertise of a judicial body.
Moreover, such a dynamic interplay would presumably influence
for the better the performance of the courts in fulfilling their
traditional constitutional role.
4. Introduce Periodic Constituent Assemblies -- The fact that past
generations establish constitutional provisions which are
extraordinarily difficult to amend or revise has always been a
matter of considerable chagrin for democrats. As an institutional
solution to this problem, Thomas Jefferson suggested that every so
50
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often all fundamental laws and institutional arrangements should
lapse and periodic assemblies convened so that each generation
had the “right to choose for itself the form of government it
believes most promotive of its own happiness.”51 Such an initiative
fits well with our efforts to combine strong democracy with weak
constitutionalism. A periodic constituent assembly every 35 or 40
years would allow people to claim the constitution as their own and
to keep it in tune with the citizenry’s changing values. As
importantly, it will also oblige citizens to debate and take
responsibility for the deep structure of their political society. Such
assemblies could be composed of delegates selected in a nationwide special election; membership could be limited to people who
are not members of the ordinary legislature and who are more
broadly drawn from different sectors of civil society. The
deliberations of the assembly could be public and its proposals
would have to be ratified by the majority of the citizens in a
national referendum. During what is likely to be a lengthy
deliberation period, the old constitutional rules would continue to
apply. Also, because political exigencies may demand more
frequent assemblies, a special procedure might be required to allow
citizens to petition directly for the convocation of a constituent
assembly that would re-draft or make important changes in the
constitution. This might demand that a petition be signed by 15%
or so of the adult population and presented to the ordinary
legislature which would then be legally obliged to call a
referendum to determine if a constituent assembly should occur.
These proposals separately and together will no doubt perplex
constitutionalists like Dworkin as they might promote constant
constitutional change and, thereby, offer a challenge to juridical
preeminence and stability. Yet to the democrat, they are nothing more than
51
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a natural corollary of a strong commitment to the ideal of self-government.
A failure to take seriously these proposals exposes constitutionalists’ weak
and begrudging embrace of democracy.

C. WHEN HERCULES MET ALEXIS
Many constitutionalists would conceive Lycurgus as the reluctant
embodiment of their theoretical and practical ambitions.52 According to
Greek legend, Lycurgus was the ‘founding father’ of the Spartan
constitution. Before visiting the Delphic oracle, he called an assembly of
the people and made everyone, including the kings and senators, promise
not to tinker with the constitution until he returned. When the oracle told
him that the constitution was well-written, Lycurgus starved himself to
death; he also had his ashes scattered in the ocean so that it could never be
claimed that he had returned in any form. The Spartans kept their promise
and the constitution remained unaltered for 500 years. However, despite
his championing by present-day constitutionalists, debate still rages as to
whether Lycurgus had made the ultimate and heroic sacrifice for his
Spartan compatriots or whether he had in fact sacrificed them to his own
vanity. In many ways, this cautionary legend captures the institutional
quandary of those contemporary jurists and theorists who struggle to
choose between the competing pushes and pulls of constitutionalism and
democracy.
It should not come as a surprise to legal scholars to learn that Lycurgus
was a direct and eleventh-generation descendant of the fabled Hercules
(which was the Roman name for the greatest hero of Greek mythology,
Heracles). Of course, apart from his fabled exploits in fighting monsters
and performing physical feats of strength, Hercules is also Dworkin’s
“imaginary judge of superhuman intellectual power and patience.”53 As
such, he is one of jurisprudence’s mythic titans who is intended to offer an
52
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idealized version of what Dworkin-instructed judges might seek to
emulate, even if they are destined always to fall short of his transcendent
example. While neither Lycurgus nor Hercules make an appearance in Is
Democracy Possible Here?, their colossal personae and influence are
present throughout. Yet such epic figures are antithetical to any ideal or
practice of engaged democracy; they give the distinct impression that truth
and justice are not achievable by ordinary people, that it takes
extraordinary abilities to create and interpret constitutions, and that debate
and deliberation are superfluous to a fully-realised civic society. Progress
is considered to be more a gift from the gods than anything else. In short,
the invocation of Lycurgian and Herculean qualities in guiding
contemporary politics works to trivialize and discourage popular
participation in democratic governance.
Because too much legal scholarship already seems to be populated by such
super-heroes and their antics, we are reluctant to add another to their
ranks. Democracy certainly does not need another hero in the Herculean or
Lycurgian tradition. Indeed, there needs to be a wholesale revision in the
thinking about what leadership demands in a political tradition which is
informed and inspired by democracy. The traditional and largely
demagogic notion of ‘political leaders’ is anathema to a democratic
sensibility; it conveys images of unquestioned authority, complaint
obedience, testosteronic endeavour and hierarchical superiority. In place
of this cult of leadership in which society’s fate seems to be tied almost
exclusively to the identity and qualities of its leaders, it is important to
develop a more appropriate and lower-key notion of leadership. However,
if democracy were to have a prototypical leader, it might be the
eponymous ‘Alexis’ who can stand in for the ordinary citizen of the truly
democratic polity.
Alexis is a modest and gregarious person. S/he recognises that, if s/he is a
leader, s/he is a reluctant one at that. Although possessing similar energies
and dynamism to more traditional leaders, s/he channels that into more
popular pursuits. S/he is a good listener and seeks to engage with rather
than mold fellow citizen’s views. However, Alexis is sufficiently sensitive
to context that s/he is aware that “the surface of American society is
covered with a layer of democratic paint, but from time to time one can
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see the old aristocratic colours breaking through.”54 Eschewing the elite
accents of the society’s power-centres, s/he travels widely and keeps
company with a wide range of people from diverse backgrounds. Most
importantly, Alexis appreciates that democratic leaders are enablers, not
enforcers. S/he acts on the idea that democratic leaders are not ones who
impose their own personal vision to attain a shallow and fearful consensus.
Rather, they help to facilitate the community’s efforts at building and
implementing its own democratic culture. As such, Alexis knows that “it
takes time to arouse minds from apathy and lethargy, to get them to
thinking for themselves, to share in making plans, and to take part in their
execution.”55 Moreover, more humble than hubristic, Alexis is willing to
stand aside and let the people take the credit for their own achievements;
s/he recognises that there is no One Right Way and that what prevails
today might well be rejected tomorrow. S/he is truly a person of the
people.

V. CONCLUSION
Is Democracy Possible Here? deserves strong praise because it puts the
important and intimate relationship between constitutionalism and
democracy at the centre of both jurisprudential and legal debate. Ronald
Dworkin tackles some of the most pressing matters on the political agenda
and does so in a sustained, practical and courageous way. As such, he has
succeeded in his ambition to “reinvigorate the argumentative dimension of
our politics” (8). Yet his contribution also deserves strong criticism
because it is the way that he has framed the general argument as much as
the specific positions that he has taken which prevent the reasonable
likelihood of there being genuine progress beyond the “degraded politics”
(147) of American and many western democracies today. Democracy
cannot and should not be exhausted by a liberal constitutionalism. By
embracing constitutionalism’s Lycurgian and elitist tendencies and by
54
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rejecting democratic openness and enhanced participation, constitutional
democrats support a weak version of democracy. In contrast, we have
proposed upsetting the supposed balance between constitutionalism and
democracy and replacing it with a stronger version of democracy.
Democracy ought not to be seen as a form of government embodied in a
constitution because democracy always escapes constitutionalization.
Instead, democracy should be advanced as a substantive manifestation of
popular sovereignty.
We can end, therefore, where we began with Dworkin’s titular question -Is Democracy Possible Here? For Dworkin, even though democracy is
presently under siege and in poor health, its realisation remains entirely
possible because the adjustments needed are more those of tone and
substance than structure or transformation. For us, democracy will only be
possible if there is a willingness to move beyond its presently anaemic and
weak form and to engineer changes that bring it closer to its more fullbloodied potential. This democratic ideal recommends that a constitution
is a part of a vigorous democracy, not something separate and aside from
it, and that the ‘sovereignty of the people’ does not end in the act of
constitution-making. A commitment to democracy presupposes a political
terrain that is never closed. Unlike constitutionalism, it places a society’s
citizens, not its judicial or philosophical consuls, at the heart of the
political process.

